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MEASURING BUBBLE EXPECTATIONS AND INVESTOR CONFIDENCE 
 







This paper presents evidence on attitude changes among investors in the US stock
market.  Two basic attitudes are explored: bubble expectations and investor confidence.
Semiannual time-series indicators of these attitudes are presented for US stock market
institutional investors based on questionnaire survey results 1989–1998, from surveys that
I have derived in collaboration with Fumiko Kon-Ya and Yoshiro Tsutsui.
Five different time-series indicators whether there is among investors an expectation of
a speculative bubble, an unstable situation with expectations for increase in the short run
only, are produced.  Four different time-series indicators whether there is an expectation of
a negative speculative bubble are presented.  Four different time-series indicators of investor
confidence, that nothing can go wrong, are produced. 
Time-series variation for these indicators is significant, and cross correlations are gen-
erally positive.  A bubble expectations index, a negative-bubble expectations index, and an
investor confidence index are derived from these indicators.
Behavior of the indicators and indexes through time is examined, and the indexes are
compared with other economic variables.  A notable finding is a degree of high-frequency
fluctuation, semester to semester, in the indexes.
____________________
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basis of this study.  The author is indebted to Yoshiro Tsutsui of Osaka University and Fumiko Kon-
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and who have been doing similar questionnaire surveys in parallel in Japan, and to Carol Copeland
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and Allan Weiss for helpful discussions along the way.  This US research was supported by US
National Science Foundation under a series of grants extending back to 1989 and by the Cowles
Foundation for Research in Economics at Yale University.
1Individual question responses are tabulated on my web site,
 http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/investor.
2For institutional investors, a random sample geographically dispersed across the United States
was obtained each year from the investment managers section of the Money Market Directory of
Pension Funds and Their Investment Managers. For individual investors, I used a list entitled “High-
Grade Multi-Investors” from W.S. Ponton, Inc, net worth generally over $250,000, with a random
selection from the United States.
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Certain investor attitudes and opinions are commonly remarked by observers of
speculative markets as having changed in important ways through time and the changes as
having important consequences for the markets.  One such attitude is “bubble expectations,”
that is, investor thinking that leads towards speculating on a perceived temporary uptrend
before the “bubble” bursts.  Another such attitude, and a very different attitude, is investor
“confidence,” an attitude that nothing can go wrong with the investment, that investors can
sleep easy since there is nothing to worry about.  While there are many other investor
attitudes that might also be studied, it appears that these two may deserve particular
consideration because of their alleged tendency to change importantly through time and their
potential importance for the behavior of markets.
There appears to be little already-available quantitative evidence on these investor
attitudes, and so those who think that there are important changes in these attitudes through
time are forced to rely mostly on their own casual and informal observations.  Most data on
investor sentiment refer to simple expectations for price change or indicators of these
expectations.  These data are useful, but may not capture essential elements of investor
thinking.  Katona [1975] has argued that most people do not have precise expectations for
future changes over specific horizons, and when asked for numerical values merely invent
them to please the interviewer.  It is best, in survey research, to study issues people think
about and in terms that are natural to them.  This paper is predicated on the assumption that
the ideas that there may be a bubble, as commonly defined, or that one can be confident that
prices will always increase, are important mental constructs whose population frequency
through time should be studied.
I, in collaboration with Yoshiro Tsutsui of Osaka University and Fumiko Kon-Ya of the
Japan Securities Research Institute, created questionnaires about investor attitudes and we
have been distributing these every six months since 1989 to institutional investors in both
the US and Japan.1  I have also distributed questionnaires to individual investors in the US
in 1989 and 1996.2  Details of the survey construction are given in Shiller, Kon-Ya and
Tsutsui [1995].  Since the basic battery of questions has been virtually unchanged in all
3Various extra questions have been appended to the end of the questionnaires, reflecting current
situations, but the beginning of the questionnaire has been virtually the same for all surveys.  See
appendix.
4First mailing dates were July 5, 1989 (institutional and individual), January 17, 1990, July 27,
1990, January 31, 1991, August 20, 1991, January 31, 1992, August 20, 1992, February 12, 1993,
August 6, 1993, February 28, 1994, September 8, 1994, March 4, 1995, September 1, 1995, March
1, 1996, July 30, 1996 (institutional) September 13, 1996 (individual), March 17, 1997, September
5, 1997, March 2, 1998, and September 9, 1998. To each person who did not respond, a second
mailing was also made several weeks after the first, with a new letter and a replacement questionnaire.
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these surveys, they allow comparisons through time (as well as across countries).3  In each
US survey, I have mailed to a random sample of 400 people, and so in the 19 institutional
investors surveys 7,600 first mailings have been made.4  The average institutional survey
produced 128 responses, for a response rate of 32 percent.  Failure to respond may reflect
many things, sometimes inadequate addresses, retirements, job changes, but apparently more
often the respondents’ lack of time to attend to the questionnaire or a feeling of lack of
appropriate knowledge or interest.
Our questionnaires concentrate on the stock market outlook, and therefore our results
have the advantage, relative to surveys that cover many issues as well as the stock market,
that we have focused the respondents thought and attention on this issue, and we should
therefore have more meaningful answers.  By asking a number of questions that relate to our
basic concepts of bubble expectations or confidence, we improve both validity and
reliability of our indexes.  Validity, that our indices measure what we want them to measure,
is improved by asking a number of questions since any given question may have associations
or interpretations that deviate somewhat from our basic concepts and that also vary through
time.  Reliability, that our indices have small standard errors, is enhanced also by averaging
over a number of questions for each respondent, therefore reducing the impact of erratic
answers.
Method and Construction of the Bubble Expectation Indicators
and Bubble Expectations Index
The questions on which the bubble expectation indicators and the bubble indexes are
created are the following:
1. Stock prices in the United States, when compared with measures of true fundamental
value or sensible investment value, are:
[CIRCLE ONE NUMBER]
1.  Too low.     2.  Too high.     3.  About right.     4.  Do not know.
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4. How much of a change in percentage terms do you expect in the following (a “+” before
your number to indicate an expected increase, a “–” to indicate an expected decrease,
leave blanks where you do not know):











Dow Jones Industrial ____% ____% ____% ____% ____% average
Nikkei Dow (Japan) ____% ____% ____% ____% ____%
5. “Although I expect a substantial drop in stock prices in the US ultimately, I advise being
relatively heavily invested in stocks for the time being because I think that prices are
likely to rise for a while.”
[CIRCLE ONE NUMBER; IF YOU CIRCLE 1.  ALSO INDICATE DATE]
1. True.  Your best guess for the date of peak: _____/____/____
2. False. month/  day  / year 
3. No opinion.
6. “Although I expect a substantial rise in stock prices in the US ultimately, I advise being
less invested in stocks for the time being because I think that prices are likely to drop
for a while.”
[CIRCLE ONE NUMBER; IF YOU CIRCLE 1.  ALSO INDICATE DATE]
1. True.  Your best guess for the date of bottom: _____/____/____
2. False. month/  day  / year 
3. No opinion.
11. “Many people are showing a great deal of excitement and optimism about the prospects
for the stock market in the United States, and I must be careful not to be influenced by
them.”
1.  True.      2.  False.      3.  No opinion.
12.  (question introduced 1994-II)  “Many people are showing a great deal of pessimism
about the prospects for the stock market in the United States, and I must be careful not
to be influenced by them.”
1.  True.      2.  False.      3.  No opinion.
5The wording of this question was slightly different in the first questionnaire: “What do you think
is the probability of a catastrophic stock market crash, like that of October 28, 1929 or October 19,
1987, in the next six months?  (An answer of 0% means that it cannot happen, an answer of 100%
means it is sure to happen.)”
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13.  What do you think is the probability of a catastrophic stock market crash in the US, like
that of October 28, 1929 or October 19, 1987, in the next six months, including the case
that a crash occurred in the other countries and spreads to the US?  (An answer of 0%
means that it cannot happen, an answer of 100% means it is sure to happen.)5
Probability in US:_______________%
The following five indicators were defined, each to represent evidence of a bubble, and each
to have a relatively simple and uncomplicated interpretation:
TOOHIGH&UP (B1) is the percentage choosing 2 in question 1 (too high) and expecting
an increase in stock prices in the shortest horizon in question 4 for which they gave an
answer.  Percentage is of those who answered question 1 (including answering no opinion)
and gave at least one US expectation in 4.
UPDOWN (B3) is the percentage who predict an increase for the US in the shortest horizon
(up to six months) for which they gave an expectation for the US in question 4 and then a
decrease over any longer horizon (up to one year).  Percentage is of those giving an answer
for the US in question 4 for the one, three or six-month horizon and who gave an answer for
at least two horizons up to one year.
RISEFORWHILE (B5) is the percentage selecting one to question 5 (think stocks will rise
for a while and advise staying in only for short run).  Percentage is of those answering
question 5 (including answering no opinion).
SEEOPTIMISM (B7) is the percentage selecting 1 to question 11 (who see optimism and
feel they must be careful not to be influenced by it).  Percentage is of those answering
question 11.
UP&CRASH (B9) is the percentage who expect an increase in stock prices in question 4
over the shortest time horizon for which they gave an expectation and who also think the
probability of a stock market crash, question 13, is greater than 10%.  Percentage is of those
answering questions 13 and giving expectations in 4 for the US for at least one horizon.
The bubble expectations index is derived by taking the average of the five indicators
variables and multiplying this average by 100 to convert to percent.  Since all indicators are
proportions of respondents (in percent) that have, by some interpretation, bubble expec-
tations, the index may be thought of loosely as an estimate of the percent of the population
with bubble expectations.
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A negative bubble index is created using the following indicators:
TOOLOW&DOWN (B2) is the percentage choosing 1 in question 1 (too low) and
expecting a decrease in stock prices in the shortest horizon in question 4 for which they gave
an answer.  Percentage is of those who answered question 1 (including answering no
opinion) and gave at least one US expectation in 4.
DOWNUP (B4) is the percentage who predict a decrease for the US in the shortest horizon
(up to six months) for which they gave an answer and then an increase over any longer
horizon (up to one year).  Percentage is of those giving an answer for the US in question 4
for the one, three or six-month horizon and who gave an answer for at least two horizons up
to one year.
FALLFORWHILE (B6) is the percentage selecting one to question 6 (think stocks will fall
for a while and advise staying out only for short run).  Percentage is of those answering
question 6 (including answering no opinion).
SEEPESSIMISM (B8) is the percentage selecting 1 to question 12 (who see pessimism and
think they must be careful not to be influenced by it).  Percentage is of those answering
question 12 (including answering no opinion).
As with the bubble index, the negative bubble index is just an average of the four indicators,
and it also has the interpretation as the average percent of the population with negative
bubble expectations.
Method and Construction of The Index of Investor Confidence
The index of investor confidence is based on questions 4 and 13 shown above and on
two more questions:
14. “If the Dow dropped 3% tomorrow, I would guess that the day after tomorrow the Dow
would:”
1.  Increase.    Give percent:___________
2.  Decrease.    Give percent:___________
3.  Stay the same.
4.  No opinion.
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15.  (question introduced 1994-II) “If the Dow dropped 25% over the next six months, I
would guess that the succeeding six months the Dow would:”
1.  Increase.    Give percent:___________
2.  Decrease.    Give percent:___________
3.  Stay the same.
4.  No opinion.
The following four confidence indicators were constructed:
ONEDAYUP (C1) is the percentage of respondents choosing 1 (increase)  in question 14.
Percentage is of all answering question, including no opinion.
SIXMONTHUP (C2) C2 is the Percentage of respondents choosing 1 (increase) in question
15.  Percentage is of all answering question, including no opinion.
CRASHSAFE (C3) C3 is 100 minus the average probability (in percent) of a stock market
crash from question 13.
ONLYUP (C4)  C4 is the percentage of respondents indicating expectations for price
increases at the one, three month, six month and twelve month horizons in question 4.
Percentage is of all who gave expectations for all four horizons.  (In earlier questionnaires,
the one-month horizon was omitted.)
The first two of these four indicators were chosen on the observation that the form that
investor confidence often seems to take is a feeling that, while stock market corrections are
sure to come from time to time, they are always soon reversed.  The investor confidence
index was computed as the average of the four indicators, except that, since before 1994-II
the question on which C2 is based was not yet asked, for those dates it was replaced its mean
1994-II to 1998-II.
The Results
The components of the bubble expectations index are shown along with the index in
Table 1, the components of the negative bubble expectations index are shown along with the
index in Table 2, and the components of the investor confidence index are shown along with
the index in Table 3.  The data shown in the tables are plotted in figures 1 through 3.
Standard errors for the components and the indexes are shown in Tables 4 through 6.
The indices show a lot of short-term oscillations.  The first thought one may have is that
these oscillations might be measurement error, but the standard errors are sufficiently small
that we may rely on much of the fluctuations as valid.
As further evidence that these oscillations are not primarily measurement error, we note
that there is substantial comovement across these indicators and substantial linkages with
6According to the NBER reference cycle dating, the recession of 1990–1991 began at a peak in
July 1990 (just before the 1990-II responses) and ended with a trough at March 1991 (at around the
time of the 1991-I responses).
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historical events.  The average correlation coefficient for the ten-pairs of bubble index
indicators is 0.30, for the six pairs of negative bubble index indicators is 0.47, and for the
six pairs of confidence index indicators is 0.13.  Note that all five of the bubble-index
indicators in 1990–1, when the 1990 recession was becoming apparent, were below their
means then.6  One year later, in 1991–1, with the recession over, all five of the indicators
had increased substantially.  Note also that the oscillations in the negative bubble expec-
tations index tend to move opposite those in the bubble expectations index, and that the
trends in the two indexes are in opposite directions.
The indicators show an apparent relation to the lagged change in stock prices.  Figure
4 shows the bubble expectations index along with the percentage change of the Dow Jones
Industrial Average over a six-month period ending ten days after the first mailing of the
questionnaire (thus around the time that respondents filled out the questionnaire).  In this
figure five of the six peaks in the bubble expectations index correspond to peaks in the
percentage change in the Dow Jones Industrial Average.  The correlation between the two
series is 0.39 and  the t statistic is 1.76.
Comparison with Existing Sentiment Indicators Related to the Stock Market
There are two basic kinds of market sentiment indexes: those that are derived from
prices or quantities in markets under a theory relating them to sentiments, and those that are
based on polling of investors.
Figure 5 shows a few examples of the first kind of sentiment indices for dates
corresponding to survey dates.  The put/call ratio is the ratio of puts to calls outstanding.
A high ratio is supposed by some to indicate negative market sentiment, but whether it does
so is very much open to question.  While it is true that people who think the market will go
down might be inclined to buy puts, the prices of puts and calls, and the price of the market
itself, are not constant when the number of people thinking the market will go down
changes.  The short interest ratio, the number of trading days at average volume required to
cover total short interest, is interpreted by some in the same way as the put/call ratio, but it
has much the same potential shortcomings.  Another indicator, the ratio of the high grade
bond price to intermediate grade bond price, one version is called the Barron’s Confidence
Index, is supposed to indicate general faith in corporations, by showing concern with default
on their debt.  But there is no reason to think it is tightly tied to people’s expectations for
the stock market price.  
De Long and Shleifer [1991] and Lee Shleifer and Thaler [1991] have claimed to infer
an indicator of market sentiment from data on discounts on closed end mutual funds. They
see an advantage in inferring sentiment in this way since the sentiment can be inferred from
market data, does not require a questionnaire survey with the risk of sample selection biases,
and allows construction of a time series very far back.  A disadvantage of their indicator,
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stressed by Chan, Kan and Miller [1993], is that it is not entirely clear that closed-end
mutual fund discounts really do measure market sentiment.  They might reflect only
confidence in closed-end mutual funds.
As can be seen from Figure 5, these varying indicators do not closely resemble each
other.  Nor do they closely resemble the bubble expectations index.  The indicator that most
closely resembles the bubble expectations index appears to be the New York Stock Ex-
change put-call ratio, which tends to show short-run movements opposite those of the bubble
expectations index.  But, even here the resemblance is not close.  Note also that none of
these indicators shows a pronounced uptrend through time, and so none resembles the
dramatic uptrend in the market over this time interval.
Figure 6 shows, for dates corresponding to survey dates, some examples of market
sentiment indexes obtained by polling people’s expectations.  The American Association
of Individual Investors has a weekly poll of its members, reporting percent bullish.  The
University of Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index is an index of overall confidence.
Investors’ Intelligence of New Rochelle New York has been computing for 35 years a tally
of investors’ advisory newsletters, categorizing the newsletters into bullish, bearish or
neutral categories.  Investors Intelligence also tallies the percent of newsletters predicting
a “correction,” which is shown in Figure 6.  While the meaning of the term “correction” is
not unambiguous, it is possibly the closest available indicator to the bubble expectations
described here, and it is the indicator that shows the closest resemblance to the bubble
expectations index.
There are still other investor sentiment indices, not shown in the figure.  Mark Hulbert,
A Forbes columnist, edits a newsletter Hulbert Financial Digest that reports the recom-
mended fraction of stocks vs t-bills in portfolios of 101 investment newsletters (Graham and
Harvey [1996], studying these data, find no evidence that these data have an ability to
predict the actual future course of the market).  Marketvane of Pasadena California has a
weekly index, a percent bullish on stock index futures prices in commodity trading
newsletters, hotlines and emails.  Their bullish consensus time series goes back to 1981
(http://home.earthlink.net/~marketvane/index.html/bul ish.htm).  A similar index is available
from Consensus Inc., Kansas City MO.
None of these indicators is really trying to capture the notion of a bubble: they are
merely indicators of expectations for the market.  The bubble index here appears to be the
first of its kind.
There is one index of investor confidence, in the United Kingdom.  It is created by
Gallup for Pearl Unit Trusts.  The index is based on answers to two questions, asking
whether the UK stock market is “likely” or “very likely” to go up in six months or one year.
Their concept of confidence appears to be a little different than that used here, which
stresses more the absence of risk of major or sustained loss.  I think that my definition is a
little closer to what we mean by “confidence,” the absence of major risks.
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Conclusion
Evidence has been presented here that bubble expectations and investor confidence as
defined here do vary through time.  There are significant semester-to-semester variations in
the indicators derived here from investor responses.
The variations through time in the indicators are often significant but not enormous.
Although certain of the indicators show striking movements, as for example an increase in
the percentage of institutional investors who think that the stock market will fall for a while
(FALLFORWHILE) from 24% to 70% between 1989-II and 1990-I, this dramatic change
in sentiment is not so strongly confirmed by other indicators.  The percentage of institutional
respondents showing bubble expectations as defined here has remained in a relatively
narrow range, with the bubble expectations index for institutional investors ranging from
14% to 31% over the entire sample.
Evidence that there is a dominant trend or other low-frequency component to the
indexes for institutional investors is weak.  The bubble expectations index and the investor
confidence index were both very low in the recession of 1990, which creates a suggestion
of a trend on the plots. However, if we exclude this recession from our sample, then investor
confidence has remained very flat.  The appearance of an uptrend in the bubble expectations
index since the recession is due primarily to only one indicator, that investors see excessive
optimism on the part of other investors (SEEOPTIMISM).  Overall, while price–earnings
ratios and price dividend ratios are at record high levels at the end of the sample here, the
institutional investor indicators here are little different from earlier times. Moreover, the
negative bubble expectations index often exceeds the bubble expectations index, even near
the end of the sample.
The observations for individual investors (Table 1) show a much greater increase in
bubble expectations between 1989-II and 1996-II than was found for institutional investors
over any time interval starting in 1989-II.  Moreover, the spread between the bubble expec-
tations index and the available negative bubble index indicators was much higher in 1996-II
for individual investors than it was for institutional investors.  But, these observations on
two points of time do not inform us much about the trend or other time pattern of individual
investor opinions.
For institutional investors, instead of substantial trend or predominantly low-frequency
variation, we find we find that indicators and indexes more nearly resemble white noise
from semester to semester.  The serial correlation coefficient for the bubble expectations
index is only 0.11, for the negative bubble expectations index is only 0.08, and for the
investor confidence index is only 0.13. 
As shown in Figure 4, the bubble expectations index shows substantially similar high
frequency movements as does the return on the stock market over the previous six months,
a return which, by the random walk theory, approximates white noise.  These data suggest
that levels of bubble expectations for institutional investors may be substantially driven by
lagged price changes over this time interval, price increases tending at all times to produce













Figure 1.  Indicators of Bubble Expectations and the Bubble Expectations Index.
Each indicator represents percentage of population showing a form of bubble














Figure 2.  Indicators of Negative Bubble Expectations and Negative Bubble
Expectations Index.  Each indicator represents percentage showing a form of negative














Figure 3.  Indicators of Investor Confidence and Investor Confidence Index.
Indicators are described in text.  The index is average of indicators shown.
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6-MO. CHANGE DJIA INDEX
Figure 4.  Percentage change in Dow Jones Industrial Average over Six Months up















Figure 5.  Indicators Related to Investor Sentiment (on Survey Dates) and Bubble
Expectations Index.
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AAII-BULL UMICHCONS II-CORRECTI INDEX
Figure 6 Market Sentiment Indicators (on Survey Dates) and Bubble Expectations
Index.
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Table 1. Indicators of Bubble Expectations and Bubble Expectations Index, in










1989-II 6.97674 21.1382 34.4371 53.66424 19.084 27.0557
1990-I 6.72269 6.25 5.97015 41.1765 10.9244 14.2087
1990-II 7.2 5.51181 11.1111 43.4783 18.254 17.111
1991-I 10.5263 12.6214 26.3566 54.8148 20.6897 25.0017
1991-II 11.8881 4.58015 16,6471 44.0789 15.6028 18.7594
1992-I 24.2038 13.0137 19.186 48.2558 27.451 26.4221
1992-II 8.84956 6.79612 12.2951 45.9016 19.469 18.6623
1993-I 15.748 13.913 27.4809 54.1353 22.0472 26.6649
1993-II 16.9643 21.875 30.7087 45.2381 26.087 28.1746
1994-I 6.48148 8.79121 19.1667 50.8197 13.8889 19.8296
1994-II 8.33333 10 12.7907 54.5455 18.3099 20.7959
1995-I 7.59494 12.6984 20.9302 51.7241 17.7215 22.1338
1995-II 6.97674 7.04225 25.2632 61.2245 10.4651 22.1944
1996-I 13.4328 17.3077 32.5301 63.8554 24.2424 30.2737
1996-II 16.6667 14.0351 20.2128 67.0213 16.6667 26.9205
1997-I 6.18557 5.10204 23.3333 65.2893 7.14286 21.4106
1997-II 29.6875 6.15385 16.2162 68.4211 20.3125 28.1582
1998-I 25.8621 4.16683 33.6066 62.0155 28.4483 30.8198
1998-II 17.5258 9.41176 18.6275 64.2202 29.1667 27.7904
Mean 13.0435 10.5478 21.4668 54.7294 19.2618 23.8099
Stddev 7.02208 5.25565 7.84972 8.51689 5.97792 4.62541
Individual Investors:
1989-I 12.9032 23.3333 43.5897 50.4274 27.3684 31.5244
1996-II 34.8624 25.4902 56.9231 65.1852 32.0755 42.9073
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Table 2.  Indicators of Negative Bubble Expectations and Negative Bubble








1989-II 2.32558 17.8862 24.6575 49.658 23.6318
1990-I 7.56303 23.2143 70.3704 49.658 37.7014
1990-II 2.4 18.1102 53.6765 49.658 30.9612
1991-I 2.63158 20.3883 34.4262 49.658 26.776
1991-II 0 28.2443 38.4106 49.658 29.0782
1992-I 0 16.4384 32.3353 49.658 24.6079
1992-II 0 20.3883 44.9153 49.658 28.7404
1993-I 2.3622 16.5217 32.8125 49.658 25.3386
1993-II 0 11.4583 21.9512 49.658 20.7669
1994-I 2.77778 26.3736 42.735 49.658 30.3861
1994-II 2.77778 26.6667 36.4706 60.2273 31.5356
1995-I 1.26582 19.0476 26.4368 45.3488 23.0248
1995-II 0 21.1268 25 45.3608 22.8719
1996-I 0 13.4615 22.7848 48.1481 21.0986
1996-II 0 15.7895 21.978 50.5263 22.0735
1997-I 1.03093 19.3878 43.1034 48.3333 27.9639
1997-II 0 15.3846 22.5352 48.6842 21.651
1998-I 0 3.85931 19.0083 42.6357 16.3758
1998-II 2.06186 18.8235 46.1538 57.6577 31.1742
Mean 1.4314 18.5564 34.7243 49.658 26.0925
Stddev 1.83951 5.50643 12.8823 3.75422 4.9442
Individual Investors:
1989-II 0 7.77778 24.3478
1996-II 0 4.90196 22.4
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Table 3. Indicators of Investor Confidence Index and Investor Confidence
Index In Percent (as plotted in Figure 3)
ONEDAY UP SIXMONTH
UP
CRASH SAFE ONLYUP INDEX
1989-II 33.3333 71.736 83.2399 40.1709 57.12
1990-I 34.7826 71.736 77.3213 12.2449 49.0212
1990-II 18.5714 71.736 75.6838 21.978 46.9923
1991-I 22.9008 71.736 81.6693 51.25 56.889
1991-II 36.1842 71.736 84.6137 55.6701 62.051
1992-I 37.8698 71.736 79.1929 53.5714 60.5925
1992-II 31.405 71.736 78.8352 33.7349 53.9278
1993-I 29.4574 71.736 77.9601 34.4444 53.3995
1993-II 37.0079 71.736 78.1805 38.8235 56.437
1994-I 33.6134 71.736 82.6036 25.3012 53.3136
1994-II 22.619 81.3953 81.3672 48.1481 58.3824
1995-I 39.5349 79.5455 83.5758 38.4615 60.2794
1995-II 37.234 75.2688 84.5974 48.4848 61.3963
1996-I 32.5301 62.1951 79.1896 42.5532 54.117
1996-II 36.9565 70.5263 84.52 51.6129 60.9039
1997-I 37.3913 73.2759 83.0711 20 53.4346
1997-II 39.726 74.3243 84.4533 41.4634 59.9918
1998-I 46.4567 54.3307 79.1543 35.443 53.8462
1998-II 40.9524 74.7664 75.7151 45.4545 59.2221
Mean 34.133 71.7365 80.7865 38.8848 56.3851
Stddev 6.67904 5.52726 97.0079 11.8103 4.12617
Individual Investors:
1989-II 35.3448 81.8498 51.2195
1996-II 46.2121 82.031 47.3684
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Table 4.  Standard Errors Bubble Expectations Indicators and Index (in










1989-II 2.24299 3.68142 3.86682 4.05813 3.32406 1.75852
1990-I 2.29555 2.28727 2.04679 4.22018 2.85959 1.44972
1990-II 2.31199 2.24845 2.7048 4.21992 3.44133 1.55351
1991-I 2.87431 3.27218 3.87897 4.28332 3.87187 1.877
1991-II 2.70649 1.82652 3.08198 4.027 3.35962 1.56556
1992-I 3.41834 2.78451 3.00242 3.81014 3.81108 1.78827
1992-II 2.67178 2.47987 2.97302 4.51155 4.31455 1.77524
1993-I 3.23222 3.22724 3.90037 4.3207 3.76913 1.91626
1993-II 3.54643 4.21923 4.09325 4.43411 4.38622 2.16522
1994-I 2.36905 2.9684 3.59317 4.52618 3.41836 1.72992
1994-II 3.25723 3.87298 3.60147 5.30795 4.95854 2.1924
1995-I 2.98055 4.19484 4.38675 5.35737 4.62359 2.21364
1995-II 2.74709 3.03647 4.4581 4.92185 3.86265 1.94718
1996-I 4.16604 5.24627 5.14232 5.27329 5.57327 2.65434
1996-II 4.21975 4.60077 4.14205 4.84908 4.39205 2.34942
1997-I 2.4459 2.67402 3.86101 4.32773 2.60154 1.63458
1997-II 5.71101 3.83667 4.28488 5.33196 5.02906 2.608
1998-I 4.06558 4.16683 4.27656 4.27325 4.18899 2.21623
1998-II 3.86022 3.1671 3.85492 4.59136 4.63902 2.11866
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Table 5.  Standard Errors Negative Bubble Expectations Indicators and Index








1989-II 1.32697 3.45553 3.56712 0 1.71354
1990-I 2.4238 3.98941 3.92999 0 2.03402
1990-II 1.36891 3.75861 4.27586 0 1.95175
1991-I 1.49922 3.96973 4.3016 0 2.01412
1991-II 0 3.93331 3.95813 0 1.86004
1992-I 0 3.0673 3.61961 0 1.58149
1992-II 0 3.96973 4.57901 0 2.02007
1993-I 1.34762 3.4631 4.1501 0 1.85689
1993-II 0 3.25087 3.73216 0 1.64982
1994-I 1.58132 4.61935 4.57345 0 2.22998
1994-II 1.93671 5.70899 5.22095 5.21733 3.37756
1995-I 1.25779 4.94726 4.72797 5.36826 3.12329
1995-II 0 4.84454 4.41942 5.05483 2.94945
1996-I 0 4.73315 4.71911 5.55174 3.09027
1996-II 0 4.8298 4.34092 5.12961 2.95031
1997-I 1.0256 4.70809 4.59801 4.56182 2.86189
1997-II 0 5.65685 4.95854 5.73341 3.37245
1998-I 0 3.85931 3.56697 4.35424 2.43269
1998-II 1.44284 4.23991 4.88838 4.6898 2.86471
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Table 6.  Standard Errors, Investor Confidence Indicators and Index (in
percentage points to be added or subtracted from values in Table 3)
ONEDAY UP SIXMONTH
UP
CRASH SAFE ONLYUP INDEX
1989-II 3.849 0 1.2353 4.51306 1.57092
1990-I 4.05437 0 1.98463 3.31132 1.47085
1990-II 3.2866 0 2.03603 4.34092 1.545
1991-I 3.67125 0 1.75551 5.58842 1.81446
1991-II 3.89764 0 1.43576 5.04398 1.70113
1992-I 3.73125 0 1.73001 4.71249 1.64284
1992-II 4.21942 0 1.85034 5.18971 1.81904
1993-I 4.01354 0 1.89004 5.00891 1.75863
1993-II 4.28438 0 1.9397 5.28604 1.85686
1994-I 4.33035 0 1.75799 4.77187 1.74626
1994-II 4.56472 4.19625 1.75638 6.79947 1.74626
1995-I 5.27222 4.29993 1.67392 6.7466 2.60657
1995-II 4.98618 4.47392 1.76087 6.15175 2.4945
1996-I 5.14232 5.35482 2.18483 7.21191 2.85097
1996-II 5.03236 4.67769 1.82002 8.97559 3.04157
1997-I 4.51184 4.10869 1.64878 4.78091 2.14582
1997-II 5.72718 5.07821 1.7229 7.69404 2.93933
1998-I 4.42563 4.42011 1.62468 5.38175 2.26932
1998-II 4.79895 4.19905 2.20967 5.67443 2.39171
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Changes in Order of Questions and Changes in Wordings of Questions
A.  Changes in Order of Questions
Questions one through six were all asked unchanged and in the same order at the
beginning of the questionnaire, The only change in this part of the questionnaire was the
addition, in the 1994-II survey, of a new question 2, starting in 1994-II, “What do you think
would be a sensible level for the Dow Jones Industrial Average based on your assessment
of US corporate strength (fundamentals)?” 
Other questions had their order changed somewhat, as indicated by the following table
of numbers of the questions (numbering shown in bold at top is for latest questionnaires):
Institutional:
1 4 5 6 11 12 13 14 15
1989-II 1 3 4 5 10 – 11 8 –
1990-I 1 3 4 5 10 – 11 8 –
1990-II 3 4 5 10 – 11 8 –
1991-I 1 3 4 5 10 – 11 8 –
1991-II 1 3 4 5 10 – 11 8 –
1992-I 1 3 4 5 10 – 11 8 –
1992-II 1 3 4 5 10 – 11 8 –
1993-I 1 3 4 5 10 – 11 8 –
1993-II 1 3 4 5 10 – 11a 8 –
1994-I 1 3 4 5 10 – 11a 8 –
1994-II 1 3 4 6 12 13 14 18 20
1995-I 1 3 4 6 12 13 14 18 20
1995-II 1 3 4 6 12 13 14 18 20
1996-I 1 3 4 6 12 13 14 18 20
1996-II 1 3 4 6 12 13 14 18 20
1997-I 1 3 4 6 12 13 14 18 20
1997-II 1 3 4 6 12 13 14 18 20
1998-I 1 3 4 6 12 13 13 14 15
1998-II 1 3 4 6 12 13 13 14 15
Individual Investors, question numbering:
1989-II 1 3 4 5 10 – 11 8 –
1996-II 1 3 4 5 10 – 11 8 –
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B.  Changes in Wording of Questions
Question 4 was expanded in 1990-I to add the ten-year horizon, and in 1993-II
questionnaire to add one more investor horizon, 1 month.  Question 13, about the probability
of a crash, had its wording changed:
Initial wording of question:
11.  What do you think is the probability of a catastrophic stock market crash, like that of
October 28, 1929 or October 19, 1987, in the next six months?  (An answer of 0% means
that it cannot happen, an answer of 100% means it is sure to happen.)
Probability:_______________% 
Starting with questionnaire 1993-II:
11a.  What do you think is the probability of a catastrophic stock market crash in the US,
like that of October 28, 1929 or October 19, 1987, in the next six months?  (An answer of
0% means that it cannot happen, an answer of 100% means it is sure to happen.)
Probability:_______________%
(11b was added to ask the same about the Japanese stock market)
Starting with questionnaire 1994-II:
14.  What do you think is the probability of a catastrophic stock market crash in the US, like
that of October 28, 1929 or October 19, 1987, in the next six months, including the case that
a crash occurred in the other countries and spreads to the US?  (An answer of 0% means that
it cannot happen, an answer of 100% means it is sure to happen.)
Probability in US:_______________%
